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DESTINATION MOON: A History of the
Lunar Orbiter Program
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- CHAPTER VIII: LUNAR ORBITER
MISSION OBJECTIVES AND APOLLO REQUIREMENTS
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- Funding and Technical Problems
- 1965
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- [199] During the
course of 1965,funding and technical problems exerted significant
influence upon the Lunar Orbiter Program's schedules. Already in
April 1965 the total projected cost of the program was up by $10
million, of which $4.5 million was required in fiscal 1965.
Scherer expressed surprise at this increase because NASA had been
maintaining very close communications with
Boeing.40
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- Langley had known early in February that
the total estimated cost of the Boeing contract was about $94.8
million, of which $4 million was to be spent for authorized
changes and $10.3 million for estimated
overruns.41 By [200] mid-March the
cost picture had changed slightly: $96.4 million for the Boeing
contract, $4.4 million for authorized changes, and $11.5 million
for estimated overruns.42 By the end of March Langley had changes under
review amounting to $7.9 million which were not yet
authorized.43 The situation did not seem to reach a plateau and
level off, and on April 26 Langley and Boeing began discussions to
curb rising costs and keep expenditures within planned funding
levels.44
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- One problem in the funding situation had
arisen in communications between Boeing and the two major
subcontractors: Eastman Kodak and RCA. The majority of the
overruns were occurring in their or, rations. Eastman Kodak
projected an increase of 26% in costs and RCA a 32% increase over
original estimates. The estimates reflected a basic
underestimation by Boeing management of the costs of the hardware
the two subcontractors were obligated to supply. Boeing had had
inadequate communications with the two companies during contract
negotiations, and the talks had taken an unusually long time to
reach final agreements. Langley realized that the situation could
be controlled only [201] through vigorous
cost reduction efforts among all participants in the program. As
things stood, the program had $49.5 million for FY 1965, which
meant that $5.8 million in unfilled orders would carry over into
FY 1966.45 Boeing also realized that in order to protect its
incentives in the contract, it would have to make an effort to
reduce the pace of expenditures while tightening up schedules with
Eastman Kodak and RCA.
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- NASA Headquarters directed Langley to
conduct specific cost reduction studies to combat surprise jumps
in the expenditure rate. Langley requested the same of Boeing.
Both actions were initiated at the beginning of May. By may 4 the
Lunar Orbiter Project Office had turned UP-32 items where
potential cost reduction might be possible. At the same time
Langley and Boeing officials visited Eastman Kodak and RCA. Their
purpose was to bring under control the costs of these two
subcontractors, to prevent surprises such as the $10-million jump
which had occurred in April, and to submit recommendations for
cost saving items which would not affect schedules or disturb
performance incentives.
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- Boeing officials conferred with Langley on
May 11 and 12. They informed Langley that Boeing was assigning one
[202]
assistant project manager to RCA and one to Eastman Kodak. These
two Officials would control changes in negotiations for changes
and keep completely informed of cost projections. Moreover, Boeing
would send Langley and NASA Headquarters weekly cost project
statements. The assistant project managers assigned to RCA and
Eastman Kodak were answerable directly to Robert J. Helberg, the
Boeing Lunar Orbiter Program Manager.46
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- In addition to strengthening its
management Boeing submitted 53 specific items for cost reduction
consideration. Nelson and Scherer were pleased at the rapidity and
extent of the Boeing probe for ways to cut costs. The 53 items
totaled approximately $8.8 million, of which, by June, NASA had
accepted over $4 million. There was still $1 million in items
being reviewed for possible cost reduction.
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- Some specific examples of major items
deleted or reduced were: 1) The program ended the requirement to
use the RCA test chamber as a back-up for the Boeing chamber at
the new Kent facility in the testing phase, saving $280,000. 2)
The need for, and frequency of, certain kinds of documentation was
reduced, saving $40,000. 3) The redundancy of photo-receiving
equipment at the Deep [203] Space
Instrumentation Facility sites was reduced, saving $250,000. 4)
The need to perform burn-in on all electronic parts of the
photographic subsystem at Eastman Kodak was altered to encompass
burn-in of certain selected parts where this process had merit,
further saving $350,000.47
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- Boeing and Langley program representatives
met at Langley on May 11 to discuss cost reductions. Langley
decided that because of funding problems in FY 1965 It would fund
Boeing on the basis of actual costs for the remainder of the
fiscal year which ended on June 30.48 By the third week in June Langley and the
contractor had reached agreement on 22 specific items for cost
reduction at an estimated savings of $4 million. Other items were
undergoing further cost reduction review.49
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- The decision to reduce by one the number
of test spacecraft was a major change in the development phase.
While it was part of the cost reduction efforts, this change
increased the risk of an operational failure. As originally
planned, Set C of the components was to be built up into
subassemblies f or system testing. After this use, it was to
become a complete spacecraft for system design verification
[204]
(SDV). Qualification testing was to be performed with Spacecraft
1. Spacecraft 2 was to be used for mission simulation tests, and
Spacecraft 3 was scheduled for performance tests at the Goldstone
DSIF site and for integration tests at the Eastern Test Range at
Cape Kennedy. The change would have the last two tests performed
with the spacecraft built from the Set C components. Spacecraft 3
would be assembled according to the existing schedule. It would
become a flight spacecraft unless required for further testing.
Should it be required for either of the last two tests, it would,
nevertheless, be refurbished and used later as a flight
spacecraft. Boeing agreed to this, making it possible to build one
less spacecraft at a saving of $1.8 million.50
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- Lunar Orbiter Program Manager Scherer felt
that the entire cost reduction effort of April, May, and June had
proved valuable for the program. The schedule was very tight and
events in the program were moving faster. This effort had forced
people to re-evaluate themselves, their procedures, and the
requirements of their jobs, and it had generated a new respect for
cost effectiveness. Exactly how much would be saved in the long
run was unpredictable, but Scherer believed that the impact of the
cost reduction effort would certainly increase the likelihood that
the [205] program would meet its launch schedule dates and
that planning and management would become more effective.
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- The Quarterly Review of mid-June at the
Boeing Company indicated that the program would indeed keep its
original launch date schedule. Boeing had brought hardware
problems under control, save for the line scan tube which had
already caused a three-week schedule slip in the photo
subsystem.51 The photographic subsystem still remained the
pacing item of the program. Boeing and NASA were completing
required test and storage facilities on schedule while
twenty-eight of the thirty-three major Lunar Orbiter components
were in their testing programs.
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- The critical testing phase of the program
would tell whether or not the original launch dates could be met.
During the summer, while Mission A was being developed, several
significant hardware problems arose to hamper progress. The line
scan tube of the readout subsystem had been failing tests, but by
the end of July a new assembly procedure had eliminated the cause
of failure. Excessive heat during the sealing of the glass
envelope had been damaging the drum bearing on which the tube
rotated, causing the electric motor to stall after a few hours of
operation. A new tube was fabricated once the problem had been
pinpointed, [206] and it successfully completed a 200-hour test.
This delay affected schedules of the ground spacecraft, but did
not alter the flight spacecraft schedules.
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- The propellent tanks of the velocity
control engine also presented a problem. Bursting during pressure
storage tests at the Bell Aero Systems Company, they seemed to
show significant stress corrosion of the-titanium alloy by the
oxidizer. This complication necessitated a major meeting among
Orbiter, Apollo, and Bell officials at North American. the prime
contractor for Apollo, to review the history of the tanks. The
Apollo Program, the prime user of these tanks, would have to find
the reason for failure before Lunar Orbiter Program officials
could accept the tanks for use in their spacecraft. In the
meantime Boeing decided to use boiler plate oxidizer tanks
whenever possible during the testing program to avoid further
delays.52
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- By September 9 Boeing was conducting its
own testing program of the Bell tanks, subjecting ten of them
tests in various configurations to determine their safety margin
for Orbiter applications. OSSA also requested NASA's Office of
Advanced Research and Technology to perform basic research t
define the specific phenomenon causing the tanks to burst.
[207]
Despite tests the tanks remained an unresolved problem. The
problem could not be pinpointed quickly, and early in November the
Lunar Orbiter Program Office reluctantly decided to decrease
stress levels by installing heavier, thicker walled tanks with a
weight penalty of two kilograms.53 Fortunately this addition did not absorb the
remaining weight margin for the spacecraft, which was relatively
generous by design.
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- A problem of leakage in the nitrogen tank
was more easily overcome during the same period. Nitrogen, a gas
of low atomic weight, was detected leaking through teflon bladders
and saturating the oxidizer for the velocity control engine. The
bladders were subsequently coated with a layer of aluminized mylar
which eliminated leakage.54
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- Progress was also hindered when Boeing
Lunar Orbiter personnel discovered excess drift in the inertial
reference unit (IRU) of one of the ground spacecraft. An
investigation revealed dirty gyros. The discovery necessitated
examination of all gyros for the IRUs in the remaining spacecraft
a task which would hold up completion of the attitude control
subsystem by thirty days. Boeing disassembled nine of
[208]
twenty-nine gyros that Sperry Rand, the fabricator, had delivered.
All nine were found to be badly contaminated.55 By the beginning of November Sperry Hand had
reworked four of the nine. but this rate was insufficient if an
impact on the schedules was to be avoided. Yet the time factor
would be doubled if NASA decided to procure gyros from another
vendors a fact which clearly revealed that Boeing and Langley were
all but frozen to their present course.56
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- These setbacks had not yet jeopardized the
schedules of the flight spacecraft, and overall progress was good.
The major exception by November was the delivery of Flight
Spacecraft 3. Delays in the delivery of the photographic subsystem
had caused slippage in its delivery. By late October Lunar Orbiter
management had narrowed the reason behind Eastman Kodak's failure
to meet schedules to two hardware items: the shutter for the
60-mm-focal-length lens and the Velocity-over-Height (V/H) sensor.
Both of these were being manufactured by a subcontractor to
Eastman Kodak, Bolsey Associates, Inc.
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- Langley sent James S. Martins the Lunar
Orbiter Assistant Project Managers to talk with Eastman Kodak and
[209]
Bolsey officials about schedules. Martin found that although
Eastman Kodak and Bolsey had very qualified people performing the
work for Lunar Orbiter, their management did not seem to place
great significance on meeting schedules. Bolsey, a small firm of
about 80 people, had only the v/H sensor and the focal plane
shutter as its two major jobs on a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract.
The company had absolutely no financial incentive to accomplish
its work on time. Bolsey's work affected the work at Eastman
Kodak, which in turn impacted upon the delivery date of Spacecraft
3.57
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- Martin insisted on major corrective
actions in coordination and control by Boeing and Eastman Kodak
management. Subsequently, Eastman Kodak assigned six full-time
persons to the Bolsey plant. The Lunar Orbiter Project Office at
Langley followed up Martin's initial visit with a complete
schedule review on November 5 and followed this with another visit
to Bolsey on November 10.58 Martin's investigations revealed that each firm had
the technical competence to do the work, but neither was
particularly devoted to completing its work within the given time.
This situation caused extensive delays, permitting the
photographic [210] subsystem to be integrated with the flight
spacecraft only at Cape Kennedy facilities, very late in the
prelaunch schedule of activities.59
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